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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we analyse the number of default investment funds appropriate for an 
occupational defined contribution pension scheme. Using a unique dataset of member 
risk attitudes and characteristics from a survey of a large UK pension scheme, we 
apply cluster analysis to identify two distinct groups of members in their 40s and 50s. 
Further analysis indicated that the risk attitudes of the two groups were not significantly 
different, allowing us to conclude that a single lifestyle default fund is appropriate.  
 
Key words: investment choices, cluster analysis, risk attitudes, risk capacity, defined 
contribution pension schemes 
 
JEL: G11, G41 
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1. Introduction 
 
Around the world occupational pension schemes are shifting from defined benefit (DB) 
to defined contribution (DC). These changes have implications for scheme governance 
(OECD, 2009). Under a DB arrangement, employers bear the investment risks of fund 
performance. In contrast, a DC scheme shifts investment risks to the individual 
member. This means that DB scheme members receive a pension defined by the 
scheme rules (conditional on the solvency of the scheme sponsor), whereas DC 
scheme members face uncertainty of pension outcomes.  
 
As a consequence, pension policy makers and regulators have recognised the need 
for a code of practice concerning the governance of DC schemes. One of the central 
governance requirements is the provision of a default investment fund. As recognised 
by the UK Pensions Commission (2005) Second Report (p. 378), there are two 
reasons for needing a default investment vehicle. First, some contributors may fail to 
inform the scheme of their asset allocation preferences, and second some members 
may “not feel well-equipped to make asset allocation decisions”.  
 
In the UK since 2012, DC pension schemes have been required to offer a minimum of 
one default investment fund for members who do not wish to exercise an investment 
choice (under section 17(2)(b) of the Pensions Act 2008).1 The design and suitability 
of these default funds have been enshrined in The Pension Regulator’s (TPR) code of 
practice for DC schemes which came into force in July 2016 (TPR (2016)). TPR (2019) 
identifies five key governance requirements (KGRs) that DC schemes should satisfy, 
and, in particular, KGR5 states “Trustee boards must ensure the default investment 
strategy is suitably designed for their members” (p. 1). The design of a suitable 
                                                 
1 Section 17(2)(b) of the Pensions Act 2008 states “no provision of the scheme requires [an active 
member of the scheme] to express a choice in relation to any matter, or to provide any information, in 
order to remain an active member” (http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/30/section/17). This has 
been interpreted to mean that the scheme must operate on the basis of one or more defaults, in 
particular, with a default minimum contribution rate and a default investment fund for those who do not 
express a choice. One of the reasons for expressing the legal arrangements in this way is that it allowed 
both the government and the scheme sponsor to avoid any legal liability for a poor pension outcome – 
unlike the case in which the contribution rate and investment fund were mandated by either the 
government or scheme sponsor. The legislation requires an employee to be auto-enrolled by the 
employer into a scheme selected by the employer. But it also allows the member to opt out of the 
scheme altogether or change the member contribution rate (so long as it does not fall below the 
minimum) or the investment fund. This places the legal responsibility for the pension outcome on the 
member. 
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investment strategy will depend on members’ risk and returns preferences, which, in 
turn, will depend on the individual members’ own preferences for risk and other 
personal attributes of the individual.2 An implication is that the more heterogeneous 
are the membership’s preferences, the more default funds are needed. The two 
extreme cases are one fund for each member and one-fund-for-all.3  
 
In this paper, we consider the UK’s largest private sector occupational pension 
scheme, the Universities Superannuation Scheme (USS), with a view to establishing 
the appropriate number of default funds required to reflect the pension scheme 
members’ attitudes to risk. We make use of a survey of USS members carried out in 
September-October 2015 in preparation for the addition in October 2016 of a new DC 
section to the existing DB pension scheme. This survey had 9,755 respondents who 
provided information about their demographic profile, risk preferences and other 
characteristics. We apply cluster analysis to these survey responses to identify similar 
groups of members with relatively homogeneous preferences and characteristics 
(Everitt et al., 2011).  
 
Our literature survey identifies member age as an important determinant of risk 
preferences, and we apply cluster analysis to different age cohorts: 30s, 40s and 50s 
(there were only small numbers of sample respondents in the other age cohorts).  The 
cluster analysis identifies just two distinct groups of members in their 40s and 50s – 
the most important age cohorts in terms of the timing, size and compounding of returns 
on pension contributions. One group displays higher pay, longer tenure, less interest 
in ethical investing, lower risk capacity, a higher percentage of males, and a higher 
percentage of academics than the members of the other group – and significantly, all 
of its members have previously taken the active decision of making additional 
contributions (in the form of additional voluntary contributions (AVCs) or added years 
                                                 
2 Not everyone agrees with this approach. For example, Bernstein (1992) calls it the ‘interior decorator 
fallacy’, namely that portfolios should reflect attitudes to risk in the same way that interior decorators 
attempt to reflect the personal taste of their clients. Such people would argue that if the aim is to 
achieve a target pension fund (or retirement income) with a specified degree of probability, then that 
is a technical exercise largely independent of a scheme member’s risk preferences. Of course, this 
view is not incompatible with having a default fund investment strategy with the same aim. 
3 It is, of course, arguable that there can only ever be a single default fund in any given scheme, given 
what the term default means.  However, when scheme membership segments into mutually exclusive 
groupings, as for example when some members are interested in ethical investing, while the rest are 
not, then more than one default fund would be needed. 
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contributions), whereas none of the members of the other cluster have made additional 
contributions.  
 
Further analysis indicated that the risk attitudes of the two groups were not significantly 
different, allowing us to conclude that a single lifestyle default fund is appropriate. 
Characteristics that other studies have found important determinants of risk attitudes, 
such as age, income and (pension) wealth, do not turn out to be as significant for USS 
members. Further, despite being on average more highly educated than the general 
population, USS members are marginally more risk averse than the general 
population, controlling for salary, although the difference is not significant.  
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the USS pension scheme. 
Section 3 provides the theoretical background, based on two-fund separation, for the 
analysis of the default investment fund and reviews the existing literature on attitudes 
and personal characteristics. Section 4 explains cluster analysis which is the research 
methodology that we apply to identify similar groupings of scheme members. The 
empirical findings are examined in section 5, and Section 6 concludes. The survey 
questionnaire emailed to USS members is reproduced as an Appendix. 
 
2. The Universities Superannuation Scheme and the survey 
questionnaire 
The Universities Superannuation Scheme4 – which covers academic and professional 
services staff in UK universities – is one of the largest pension schemes in the UK, 
with 420,000 members, comprising 200,000 active, 69,000 deferred, and 151,000 
pensioner members.5   
 
On 31 March 2016, it closed its final salary section to future accrual and replaced this 
with a career average revalued earnings (CARE) section. The final salary section had 
already been closed to new members since 31 March 2011. This new defined benefit 
(DB) section, named USS Retirement Income Builder, has an annual accrual rate of 
                                                 
4 https://www.uss.co.uk/ 
5 USS Report and Accounts 2018. 
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1/75th, Consumer Price Index (CPI) uprating of the pension in payment,6 and a tax-
free lump sum at retirement equal to three times the initial pension.  
 
On 1 October 2016, a salary threshold was introduced, initially set at £55,000 per 
annum, above which member and employer contributions were paid into a new defined 
contribution (DC) section, named USS Investment Builder, and USS became a hybrid 
scheme with some members building up both DB and DC benefits. In 2016, 
contribution rates were set at 18% of salary for the employer and 8% of salary for 
members up to £55,000.7 Above £55,000, the employer contribution rate was 12% of 
the excess, while the member’s contribution rate was 8% of the excess. Members at 
all salary levels could make AVCs into the DC section and initially this could be 
“matched” from the employer for additional contributions up to 1% of salary.8 
 
To design the new DC section, USS undertook a programme of research in 2015 to 
understand member needs within the hybrid scheme. This included comparative 
studies of other DC schemes and prevailing pension industry best practice, 
demographic analysis of the USS membership to understand risk capacity, member 
outcome analysis based on stochastic modelling of possible investment strategies and 
member impacts and focus groups.9  As part of this programme, in October 2015, USS 
worked with A2Risk10 to design a risk attitudes survey of USS members. The primary 
purpose of the survey was to inform USS’s understanding of risk attitude and 
investment beliefs in order to support the design of the USS Investment Builder 
investment fund range. USS required information on four aspects of financial planning 
from the survey: (1) personal circumstances,11 (2) attitude to risk (ATR), (3) capacity 
                                                 
6 USS will match increases in CPI for the first 5% plus half of the difference above 5% up to a 
maximum increase of 10%. So, if CPI increased by 20%, the USS pension would increase would be 
10%. (https://www.uss.co.uk/members/members-home/retiring/pensions-in-payment) 
7 Annually uprated in line with inflation. 
8 USS member presentation, July 2016. The 1% employer match was removed in April 2019. 
9 A summary of this research can be found at https://www.uss.co.uk/~/media/document-
libraries/uss/scheme/uss-investment-builder-a-summary-of-research.pdf?la=en 
10 http://www.a2risk.com/ 
11 Information was collected on: institution, age, gender, annual salary, expected retirement age, 
years of membership of USS, whether the member’s role was predominantly academic or 
professional services, whether AVCs were being made, whether the member could reasonably expect 
to live a long and healthy retirement, and whether the USS pension was likely to be the main 
household income in retirement. 
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to bear risk as measured by capacity for loss (CFL),12 and (4) investment beliefs, 
including ethical considerations. An online questionnaire was distributed to members 
by participating employers in the scheme. A total of 9,755 responses were collected,13 
making it one of the largest surveys of risk attitudes in the UK. Members were 
requested to answer 12 ATR questions and the results can be compared against a 
survey of the UK national population conducted by A2Risk via YouGov at around the 
same time.  
 
As explained earlier, there was a legal requirement to put a suitable default investment 
fund in place for the start of the hybrid scheme in October 2016. USS reviewed the 
international evidence on the design of investment fund defaults. One example that it 
examined was the Australian pension fund, QSuper, which designed its default funds 
by segmenting its members according to age and size of the accumulated fund.14 
QSuper has eight gender-neutral lifetime groups based on age and fund size. 
Members are first allocated to the group most suitable for them and then are 
automatically moved as they age: they are moved from higher risk to lower risk assets, 
consistent with an age-dependent investment strategy called lifestyling or lifecycling 
(Blake et al., 2014). They are also moved if their pension fund size changes 
sufficiently, through investment returns, contributions or transfers.15  
 
USS’s aims were to (1) design of the default lifestyle fund(s) so it (or they) were aligned 
with the objectives and preferences of the majority of USS members saving in USS 
Investment Builder, and (2) assess whether there are identifiable groups of members 
within the USS membership with heterogeneous objectives and preferences that may 
need to be actively supported towards an investment fund (default or self-select) that 
is better suited to meeting their long-term objectives.  
 
                                                 
12 CFL is defined as the ability to sustain losses on an investment portfolio and this will be influenced 
by factors such as the number of dependants, existing financial commitments, etc. 
13 Equal to 6.6% of active members. The sample was assessed as being broadly representative of the 
active membership of USS in terms of the age and salary distributions, the gender balance and the 
balance between academic and professional services staff. 
14 https://qsuper.qld.gov.au/our-products/investment-options/lifetime/ 
15 The reason for this is that the first pillar state pension in Australia (the “age pension”) is means 
tested, implying that a higher second pillar pension will reduce the age pension. The size-related 
default funds are designed to minimise reductions from the two systems. 
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3. Two-fund separation and factors influencing risk attitudes 
 
3.1 Two-fund separation 
Tobin (1958) demonstrated that the mean-variance model of portfolio selection 
framework of Markowitz (1952) leads to two-fund separation whereby all investors  
hold a combination of the same portfolio of risky assets and the risk-free asset. It is 
possible to use this framework to assess the optimality of the default fund asset 
allocation in a pension scheme.  Figure 1 shows the location of a particular default 
fund on the capital market line which combines a portfolio of risky assets with the safe 
asset. In addition, we include the risk-return preferences of three pension scheme 
members (A, B, C). This default fund matches the optimal preferences of B, but the 
constraint of a single default means that scheme members A and C suffer a welfare 
loss. The risk-return combination for the default fund is too low for A and too high for 
C.  
[Figure 1 around here] 
 
In the extreme, the pension scheme could minimise these welfare losses by setting up 
a default fund for each member. However, this would be costly. Alternatively, if the 
scheme could segment the membership into a number of distinct groups based on 
similar risk-return characteristics, this would reduce the number of default funds 
required. If the entire scheme membership was sufficiently homogeneous, then just a 
single default fund would be sufficient. In reference to Figure 1, the empirical question 
is whether there are groups of scheme members with similar sets of preferences, and 
how close are these group preferences to each other. Our aim in this paper is to 
identify groups of sufficiently homogeneous pension scheme members to assess the 
minimum number of default funds required. 
We explained in footnote 1 that the legislation in the UK requires DC pension funds to 
establish at least one default fund into which compulsory contributions are allocated 
when members do not record any choice. However, although members may not make 
explicit choices, they may have identifiable characteristics such as gender or age, 
which the pension scheme can utilise to make an appropriate decision on the scheme 
members’ behalf. Individual risk-return preferences depend on a range of 
demographic (including gender and age), socio-economic, health and personality 
factors. We now summarise the evidence on these key factors. 
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3.2 Factors influencing risk attitudes 
3.2.1 Gender 
A large body of evidence suggests that, on average, women are more risk averse than 
men and this has consequences for financial decision making contexts, such as asset 
allocation, trading patterns and ethical choices (e.g., Bajtelsmit and Bernasek (1996), 
Powell and Ansic (1997), Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998), Schubert et al. (1999), 
Finucane et al. (2000), Croson and Gneezy (2009) and Dohmen et al. (2011)). 
However, Nelson (2017) concludes that there was little evidence for gender 
differences, claiming instead that existing studies were contaminated with confirmation 
bias or gender stereotyping. 
 
With respect to pension schemes, Bajtelsmit and VanDerhei (1997), Hinz et al. (1997) 
and Sundén and Surette (1998) report gender differences in participant-directed 
pension investments, with women selecting more conservative investments. Watson 
and McNaughton (2007) examined the impact of gender on the pension fund risk 
preferences of staff in the Australian university sector. They also find that women 
choose more conservative investment strategies than men and that, combined with 
lower contributions (as a result of lower salaries), explains why women have lower 
projected retirement benefits than men in Australian universities.  
 
Overconfidence is another acknowledged difference between men and women. Lenny 
(1977), Meehan and Overton (1986), and Gervais and Odean (2001) find that men are 
generally more confident about their own abilities than women. Over-optimistic 
investors also tend to make poorer investment decisions (Hunt et al., 2015): Barber 
and Odean (2001) document that men transact their common stock investments 45% 
more frequently than women, and this excessive trading reduces men’s net investment 
returns compared with women.  
 
Ethical behaviour differs by gender, with women generally behaving more ethically 
than men (Dollar et al., 2001; Borkowski and Ugras, 1998)). Betz et al. (1989) use data 
from a sample of 213 business school students and find that men are more than twice 
10 
 
as likely as women to engage in actions regarded as unethical. Beams et al. (2003) 
finds the social stigma of trading on inside information was a more important deterrent 
for female respondents than male respondents. Often these risk aversion and trading 
studies are undertaken in relation to particular samples of participants, such as 
business school students, and the results may not be directly applicable to other 
distinct groups. Johnson and Powell (1994) compare the decision-making 
characteristics of males and females in “non-managerial” positions with those in 
“managerial” positions and find that for those in managerial positions of both genders 
display similar risk attitudes and make decisions of comparable quality. Atkinson et al. 
(2003) and Niessen and Ruenzi (2006) compare the performance of male and female 
mutual fund managers. Both studies find that male and female managed funds do not 
differ significantly in terms of performance, risk, and other fund characteristics.  
 
Eckel and Grossman (2008) show that studies with contextual frames show less 
consistent differences in risk aversion between men and women. Perceptions are also 
important. Siegrist et al. (2002) show that both men and women overestimated male 
risk preferences, but accurately predicted female risk preferences, suggesting that 
predictions were influenced by knowledge about risk preferences incorporated in 
gender stereotypes. 
3.2.2 Age 
Life-style investment strategies, as frequently advocated by financial advisors, state 
that young people should invest in risky assets and shift gradually to safer assets as 
they age. This strategy has been criticised by Samuelson (1989a) on the grounds that, 
for a given degree of risk aversion, the optimal asset allocation should be independent 
of age (see also Poterba et al. (2006)). However, if it is the case that risk aversion 
does indeed decline with either age or the length of the financial planning horizon, then 
this provides a justification for life-styling (Samuelson (1989b) and Schooley and 
Worden (1999)).  
 
Most studies investigating whether risk aversion changes with age show that very 
young people and very old people tend to be risk averse. Between these ages, risk 
aversion initially falls before rising again following a U-shaped pattern (e.g., Riley and 
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Chow (1992), Bakshi and Chen (1994), and Pålsson (1996)). Although contrary 
evidence is provided by Wang and Hanna (1996) who show that risk aversion falls 
with age controlling for other variables. Brooks et al (2018), while confirming that risk 
aversion falls with age (which they call the pure age effect), find evidence that falling 
risk aversion is associated with a reduced ability to bear losses and a declining 
investment horizon. There is also evidence of a specific cohort effect with different 
generations having different risk attitudes at the same age – possibly influenced by 
experience when young. Gilliam et al. (2010) find that leading baby boomers are less 
risk tolerant than trailing baby boomers.  
 
Korniotis and Kumar (2011) identify two effects of age on financial investments. First, 
they find that older experienced investors make better investment decisions, because 
they follow rules of thumb that reflect greater investment knowledge. However, there 
is a second effect that investment skill deteriorates with age due to the adverse effects 
of cognitive aging. Older investors are less effective in applying their investment 
knowledge and exhibit worse investment skill, especially if they are less educated, 
earn lower income, and belong to ethnic minority groups. Overall, the adverse effects 
of aging appear to dominate the positive effects of experience. Dohmen et al. (2010) 
confirm that lower cognitive ability in otherwise healthy people is associated with 
greater risk aversion. Kim et al. (2016) conclude that older investors should delegate 
their investment decisions to experts. 
3.2.3 Socio-economic, health and personality factors 
Most studies find that risk aversion decreases with higher salary and wealth, 
controlling for other factors such as gender, age, education and financial knowledge 
(e.g., Riley and Chow (1992), Grable (2000), Hartog et al. (2002), Campbell (2006), 
Guiso and Paiella (2008), and Grinblatt et al. (2011)). However, individuals who are 
more likely to face salary uncertainty or to become liquidity constrained exhibit a higher 
degree of risk aversion (Guiso and Paiella (2008)). Similarly, individuals become more 
risk averse after a negative shock to wealth, such as a reduction in the value of their 
home (Paravisini et al. (2017)).  
 
12 
 
Individuals with higher levels of general educational attainment or higher IQs tend to 
be more risk tolerant (e.g., Grable (2000) and Grinblatt et al. (2011)). This is strongly 
reinforced if individuals also have a high degree of financial literacy (Behrman et al. 
(2012), and Lusardi and Mitchell (2014)). Financial literacy tends to be lower amongst 
the young, women, the less educated, and ethnic minorities (Lusardi and Mitchell 
(2011)).  Individuals who score higher on the financial literacy questions are much 
more likely to plan for retirement. Financial planning can explain the differences in 
levels of retirement savings and why some people reach retirement with very little or 
no wealth (Lusardi and Mitchell (2007, 2011)). Bluethgen et al. (2008) find that 
financial advice can also help to overcome risk aversion, especially for women, and 
lead to more diversified portfolios that are better targeted to achieving an investor’s 
goals.  
 
Health is another factor that can influence risk aversion. A typical finding is that 
financial risk tolerance is positively associated with both health and life expectancy 
(Hammitt et al., 2009).  But particular diseases can change people’s risk attitudes. For 
example, Tison and Hammitt (2018), using data from the US Health and Retirement 
Study, find that people suffering from cancer and arthritis can become less risk averse, 
while people with diabetes can become more risk averse.  Sinz et al. (2008) report 
that individuals with mild Alzheimer's disease (AD) gambled more often in situations 
with low-winning probabilities and less frequently in situations with high-winning 
probabilities than healthy participants in controlled experiments. Delazer et al. (2007) 
concluded that people with mild AD made such frequent changes between strategies 
that decisions were being made randomly. Smoski et al. (2008), in a controlled 
experiment, found that depressive participants would learn to avoid risky responses 
faster than control participants. They conclude that depressive individuals tend to have 
enhanced feedback-based decision-making abilities, but are more risk averse than 
non-depressive individuals. 
 
Attitude to risk can be influenced by personality type. Psychologists distinguish 
between Type A personalities – who are categorised as being competitive, outgoing, 
ambitious, impatient and/or aggressive – and Type B personalities – who are more 
laid back. Type A individuals tend to take greater financial risks than Type B individuals 
according to a study by Carducci and Wong (1998).  Another way of differentiating 
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between individuals is through the types of jobs they choose. Studies show that 
entrepreneurs are more risk tolerant than employees, private-sector employees are 
more risk tolerant than public-sector employees, and professionals are more risk 
tolerant than employees without a professional qualification (Grable (2000) and Hartog 
et al. (2002)). 
 
The degree of risk aversion is also influenced by marital status. Sung and Hanna 
(1996) and Yao and Hanna (2005) show that single women are more risk averse than 
single men or married couples. Having children tends to increase risk aversion 
amongst both men and women according to Chaulk et al. (2003), Hallahan et al. (2004) 
and Gilliam et al. (2010). 
 
None of the above factors can fully explain an individual’s risk aversion. There are 
numerous other factors that influence risk attitude – typically given the name 
background risks – such as the weather, emotional factors, and the environment in 
which an individual lives (Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003), Kamstra et al. (2003), 
Guiso and Paiella (2008)). USS members typically have high levels of general 
educational attainment and many may also have a high degree of financial literacy. In 
terms of other identifiable factors, the USS questionnaire asked questions on salary, 
job type, and health and marital status. 
4. Research methodology 
 
We apply cluster analysis to the 9,755 responses to the USS/A2Risk member risk 
attitudes and investment beliefs survey conducted in September-October 2015. 
Cluster analysis is an exploratory data analysis technique used to identify patterns in 
a data sample (Everitt et al., 2011). Most cluster analysis methods use some type of 
distance measure, such as Euclidean distance, for determining the similarity or 
dissimilarity between observations. We also apply data transformations through factor 
analysis before applying the cluster analysis. 
 
Cluster analysis has been used extensively in market research – to identify distinct 
homogeneous groups based on purchasing patterns – and we follow the best-practice 
approach outlined in Tuma et al. (2011) and Tuma and Decker (2013).  Cluster 
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analysis has previously been applied to research questions in pensions. Speelman et 
al. (2013) undertake a cluster analysis of groups of savers in Australia, and report that 
gender differences dominate outcomes. Gough and Sozou (2005) identify the attitudes 
of UK consumers to pension savings, and analyse 540 respondents that had made 
inquiries about pensions, and identify 6 groups based on age, income and DB 
membership. Deetlefs et al. (2015) examine a sample of UniSuper members,16 and 
use cluster analysis to identify groups of similar members, and then use these clusters 
to predict the likelihood of these groups choosing default options and levels of 
engagement with the pension scheme.  
 
There are two main methods of cluster analysis. Partition clustering and hierarchical 
clustering. A commonly used partition clustering method is “k-means cluster analysis”, 
where we specify in advance the number of clusters, k, and an iterative algorithm is 
used to determine which observation should be included in each group. Each 
observation in the sample is assigned to one of the k groups based on the closeness 
of the value of the observation to the mean value of the kth group. For each group, the 
group mean is computed, and an observation is reassigned to another group if it is 
closer to the other group’s mean. New group means are determined, and these steps 
continue until no observation changes groups.  
 
Following Everitt et al. (2011, p. 114), the k-means partition method specifies in 
advance k groups, and then assigns observations to these groups by minimising the 
error sum-of-squares (SSE) between observations and their group mean 
min 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = ��𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑚𝑚2𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚
𝑚𝑚=1
𝑘𝑘
𝑚𝑚=1
 
 
where nm is the number of members of the mth group and dmi,m is the Euclidean distance 
between the ith observation in the mth group and the mean of mth group.17 
 
                                                 
16 UniSuper is the one of Australia’s largest pension schemes with 460,000 members and is open to 
all employees in the higher education and research sectors (Dobrescu et al. (2017)). 
17 In this case, the method simply minimises the sum across the k groups of the sum of squared 
differences between each observation in each group and the mean of that group. 
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An alternative to partition clustering is hierarchical clustering, which creates 
hierarchically related sets of clusters. Agglomerative hierarchical clustering methods 
start with each observation in the sample of N observations being in a separate group 
(N groups each of size 1). The closest two groups are combined (giving N-1 groups: 
one of size 2 and the rest of size 1), and this process continues until all observations 
belong to the same group. This process creates a hierarchy of clusters. The simplest 
hierarchical method is single-linkage, which computes the similarity between two 
groups as the similarity between the closest pair of observations in the two groups. In 
our analysis, to measure the closeness between groups, we apply Ward’s clustering 
method (Ward (1963)) in which the criterion for joining groups is based on a within-
cluster error sum-of-squares. Following Everitt et al (2011) let SSE be the total within-
cluster error sum-of-squares, then Ward’s method is to 
min 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = � 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘
𝑚𝑚=1
 
where  𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚 = ∑ ∑ �𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑗𝑗 − ?̅?𝑥𝑚𝑚,𝑗𝑗�2𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗=1𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1  and where ?̅?𝑥𝑚𝑚,𝑗𝑗 = (1 𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚⁄ )∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 , with xmi,j 
being the value of the jth variable (j = 1, . . .,p) for the ith observation (i= 1, . . . .,nm) in 
the mth group (m = 1, . . . ,k). 
 
The objective of using cluster analysis in our case is two-fold: (1) to identify groups of 
individuals with similar risk attitudes and/or risk capacities; and (2) having done this, 
to examine whether these individuals exhibit particular demographic and personal 
characteristics. Based on the literature review, we will be able to answer the following 
questions for our data sample: (1) Does risk aversion vary by gender?, (2) Are women 
more likely to be interested in ethical investments?, (3) Does risk aversion vary by 
age?, (4) How does risk aversion vary with salary?, (5) How does risk aversion vary 
with job type (academic vs professional services)?, and (6) Are USS members more 
risk averse than members of the general public?  
5. Empirical findings  
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
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The data sample includes an anonymous code for each individual, and a series of 
demographic and personal characteristics self-reported by the survey respondent 
(Section A of the Appendix) including: age (within five-year bands), gender, marital 
status (including married, civil partnership, single, divorced, separated, widowed), 
annual salary (within £10,000 bands), expected retirement age, length of USS 
membership, job-type (academic or professional services), whether the member could 
reasonably expect to live a long and healthy retirement, and whether the USS pension 
is expected to be the main source of income in retirement.  
[Table 1 about here] 
Participants in the survey then answered a series of questions around a number of 
different themes establishing: (1) their previous additional contributions to USS (in 
terms of AVC contributions or buying additional years of service in the DB section); (2) 
their attitude to risk (Section B, with 14 questions18); (3) their capacity to bear risk 
(Section C, with 6 questions); (4) ethical beliefs in investing (Section D, with 6 
questions, plus a question on attitude to Shariah-compliant funds, and a further 5 
questions on the desirable properties of DC funds); and (5) intentions with respect to 
participating in the new DC section operated by USS (Section E, with 2 questions).  
Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics on the sample of participants. Panels A 
and B show that the median respondent is a 47-year old married male academic who 
has been a member of USS for 7 years with a salary of £50,000. This person intends 
to retire at 65 and expects to have a long healthy retirement during which the USS 
pension will be the household’s main source of income. Further, this person has not 
previously made additional contributions to USS via AVCs or additional years of 
service. Recall that the DB section continues to operate as the main pension scheme 
for individuals earning up to £55,000 (through USS Retirement Income Builder), so 
that many individuals completing the USS survey might not be expected to 
automatically participate in the new additional DC scheme (USS Investment Builder), 
unless they actively select the match.19 
                                                 
18 Twelve questions (numbered 12-23) were used to assess attitude to risk. Two additional questions 
(numbered 24 and 25) were used as validity checks.  
19 While it was operating prior to April 2019. 
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5.2 Cluster analysis 
Cluster analysis works most effectively when the number of observations and the 
number of variables is relatively small because the algorithms used compute many 
pairwise comparisons.20 To reduce the size of the data matrix (number of participants 
by number of variables), we split the sample by age of the participant, and form groups 
of participants based on the age distribution. Panel C of Table 1 shows the age 
distribution of the sample of respondents, and because of the relatively small number 
of respondents in their 20s (426 observations) and above sixty years of age (741), we 
concentrate our analysis on the remaining 8,588 members. We form three cohorts of 
respondents in their 30s (2,412), 40s (3,041) and 50s (3,135), and apply cluster 
analysis to each age cohort separately. 
To reduce the dimensionality of the problem even further, we note that each theme 
asks a range of questions, so, using factor analysis, we analyse the correlation matrix 
of responses to identify a smaller number of common factors. To illustrate, there are 
six questions in the sample inviting responses on the individual’s capacity for bearing 
risk (CFL). The correlation matrix in this case indicated that the responses were so 
highly correlated across respondents that we could reduce the potential number of 
questions to two (Q26 and Q27). A similar analysis suggested that there were just two 
potential questions in the case of ethical investment beliefs (Q32 and Q33) – revealing 
that, at most, two factors could explain most of the responses in these two themes. 
Table 2 shows the results of the factor analysis for the two themes. In both cases, 
there is a negative value on the second factor, indicating that just a single factor can 
explain the responses to the two sets of questions – and indeed the full set of questions 
for both themes.  
[Table 2 about here] 
 
A number of questions on the themes of DC investment intentions had ambiguous 
responses, and so we only retained one DC investment intentions question (being Q39 
on the intention to “match” the additional employer contribution). The responses to the 
questions on the desirable properties of DC investments were poorly answered in the 
                                                 
20 Cluster analysis is subject to the “curse of dimensionality”. 
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survey, with many participants not providing any answers. Some of the responses 
were also ambiguous and therefore this set of questions was dropped from the 
subsequent analysis.  
Finally, there was the set of responses around the theme of attitude to risk. Each 
response was aligned on a 1-to-5 point Likert-scale to represent a risk attitude and 
then we averaged these responses across the 12 attitude to risk questions to provide 
an average risk aversion score (av_ATRQ). In Figure 2, we plot the distribution of 
av_ATRQ by age, with higher values representing greater risk aversion. While the 
distributions look similar, Figure 3 plots the average value of av_ATRQ within each of 
the eight 5-year age groups in our data set (age range 25-29 centred on age 27, up to 
age range 60-64 centred on age 62). This shows the broadly U-shaped pattern 
previously identified in the literature. A Bartlett test for equal variances rejects the 
hypothesis that the distributions in Figure 2 are the same (χ2(7) = 27.38).  However, 
pair-wise tests of the difference in means of adjacent distributions indicates that only 
the 35-39 and the 40-44 age groups have statistically significantly different means. We 
can conclude that, while there is a U-shaped distribution in Figure 3, the differences in 
the average ATRQ scores across age groups are economically small. 
[Figure 2 and 3 around here] 
How do these USS member ATRQ scores compare with the UK adult population as a 
whole? A2Risk conducted a YouGov survey of risk attitudes of the UK adult population 
at around the same time as the USS survey. Average earnings for USS members were 
£38,000 and over 90% of respondents reported an income above £30,000. Since at 
the time, average UK earnings were around £26,000, it is clear USS members have 
above-average salaries compared with the UK adult population. USS members are on 
average less risk averse than the UK adult population (an av_ATRQ of 3.41 compared 
with 3.56). However, when we compare the USS risk aversion scores with those of the 
UK adult population with an income above £30,000, USS members are marginally 
more risk averse (3.41 compared with 3.34).21 We find a higher percentage of USS 
members who are labelled “cautious” by A2Risk: 16% of USS members compared to 
10% of UK adults earning £30,000 or more. Slightly fewer USS members are 
                                                 
21 The standard deviation of the scores of both groups is very similar (both are close to 0.7), indicating 
that the difference between the scores is not statistically significant. 
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“moderately adventurous” or “balanced”. Male respondents in the USS survey tended, 
on average, to be less risk averse than female respondents, and this finding is 
consistent with the UK population when controlled for age and salary. For both USS 
and UK samples, ATRQ scores tend to be correlated with income but do not vary much 
by age.22  
 
On the basis of the factor analysis and the average risk aversion scores, we now have, 
for each individual in the sample, one or more estimated values for the responses to 
each of the four sets of themed questions: (1) attitudes to risk (av_ATRQ); (2) interest 
in ethical investing (a single factor); (3) risk-bearing capacity (a single factor); and (4) 
DC investment intentions (the match). In addition, we also know from Question 9 in 
the Appendix whether the respondent has made additional contributions to USS in the 
past through AVC contributions or the purchase of additional years in the DB section. 
We denote these five variables “investment characteristics” to differentiate them from 
variables, such as gender, age and salary etc, which we denote as “personal 
characteristics”. We now turn to the cluster analysis results. 
5.3 Findings 
We wish to identify whether there are patterns or clusters in these factors across the 
individuals in the sample. We are particularly interested in applying cluster analysis to 
the three age cohorts 30s, 40s and 50s across our five standardised variables:23 (1) 
av_ATRQ (with a higher value denoting greater risk aversion); (2) a single ethics factor 
(with a higher value denoting a greater interest in ethical investing); (3) a single risk 
capacity factor (with a higher value denoting lower risk-bearing capacity); (4) match 
intentions (with a higher value indicating a stronger intention to match the employer 
contribution); and (5) additional contributions (which is a dummy variable taking the 
value unity if previous additional USS contributions have been made, and zero 
otherwise).  
                                                 
22 We show later that these correlations are not statistically significant (see Table 10). 
23 Because cluster analysis minimises a weighted sum of error-sum-of-squares, the results will be 
influenced by the size of a particular variable. Therefore, each of the five variables of interest is 
standardised to have zero mean and unit variance. 
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There are two methods for judging the appropriate number of clusters in a dataset: the 
Calinski-Harabasz pseudo-F statistic and visual inspection of a dendrogram. Calinski-
Harabasz (1974) computes a pseudo-F statistic based on the ratio of the (between-
clusters sum-of-squares)/(k-1) and the (within-cluster sum-of-squares)/(N-k), where k 
is number of clusters and N is number of observations. The appropriate number of 
clusters is where the Calinski-Harabasz statistic is maximised. This criterion can be 
used for both k-means partitions and for hierarchical approaches. The second method, 
relevant for hierarchical approaches only, is visual inspection of a dendrogram. 
Figure 4 reports the dendrogram from applying Ward’s method to the 50s age-cohort, 
and suggests that, across the five standardised variables, there are just two clusters 
in this sub-sample of the dataset. The vertical axis shows how the L2squared 
dissimilarity measure24 between groups increases as more members are added to 
existing groups. A large jump in the dissimilarity measure suggests a cut-off for the 
number of clusters – at two in this case. 
[Figure 4 and Tables 3 & 4 around here] 
Table 3 reports the Calinski-Harabasz pseudo-F statistics for both Ward’s hierarchical 
and the k-means partition methods for each age cohort. The F-statistic takes its 
highest value for groupings of two clusters in all age cohorts (30s, 40s and 50s). 
 
In addition, we examine the observations identified by the clusters from both the 
hierarchical and k-means partitions to assess whether the two methods classify the 
observations into the same two sets of clusters. The results of these cross-tabulations 
are reported in Table 4. Panel A shows the cross-tabulations of the observations in 
the 30s age-cohort of the two clusters (Group) formed by both Ward’s hierarchical 
method and the k-means partition (Clusters). So, for example, there are 833 
observations that are in the first cluster defined by Ward’s method and also in the first 
cluster defined by the k-means partition. However, there are 243 observations that are 
in the first cluster defined by Ward’s method but happen to be in the second cluster 
defined by the k-means partition method. The implication from Panel A, is that, for the 
30s age-cohort, the two clustering methods produce different groupings, from which 
we conclude that clear and robust clusters do not exist for this age cohort. But this is 
                                                 
24 The Stata name for the minimised squared Euclidean distance between groups. 
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not a severe problem, given the low numbers of USS members in their 30s with 
salaries above £55,000 and hence eligible for USS Investment Builder. 
Turning to the other two panels for the 40s and 50s cohorts, the two methods produce 
very similar groupings for the 40s cohorts (Panel B), and identical groupings for the 
50s cohort (Panel C). We can therefore be very confident that the clusters formed for 
the 40s and 50s cohorts are robust to the clustering method used.  
We also examine the distribution of the demographic and personal characteristics of 
individuals allocated to each of the two groups. The results, reported in Table 5, 
illustrate the distribution of variables across members of the two sets of clusters for 
the 40s age-cohort and for the 50s age-cohort. 
[Table 5 around here] 
Examining the numbers for the 40s age cohort first of all, it can be seen that there are 
large differences between the two clusters, with Cluster 2 displaying higher pay, longer 
tenure, additional contributions, less interest in ethical investing, lower risk capacity, a 
higher percentage of males, and a higher percentage of academics than the members 
of Cluster 1.25 The additional contributions (in the form of AVC or added years 
contributions) is particularly noteworthy, since all members of the second cluster have 
made these contributions, but, in contrast, none of the members of the first cluster 
have made additional contributions. A multivariate analysis-of-variance test indicates 
that the differences in these variables between the two groups (e.g., differences in 
pay) are in aggregate statistically significant, indicating that the two clusters are 
statistically significantly different. There are, however, only small differences between 
the two clusters in terms of the degree of risk aversion and the propensity to match 
employer contributions.  
Turning to the results for the 50s age-cohort, there are similar differences between the 
two clusters for most of the variables, with the exception that ethical investment beliefs 
are now similar across the two groups. As with the 40s age cohort, all the members of 
                                                 
25 We might normally expect that a cohort with higher pay would have higher risk capacity, but in this 
case the higher concentration of males (who might be the main source of retirement income in the 
family) and longer tenure (implying greater reliance on the USS pension as the main and possibly 
only occupational pension) mean that this higher-pay cohort has lower risk capacity. Further, the 
guaranteed DB pension will provide a lower percentage of the total USS pension for this cohort, 
reinforcing the lower risk capacity. 
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the second cluster have previously made additional contributions with USS, whereas 
none of the members of the first cohort have. Again, a multivariate analysis-of-variance 
suggests that the differences between the two groups are in aggregate statistically 
significant.  
[Tables 6 & 7 around here] 
This leads to an interesting and potentially significant conjecture. Although our data 
set is cross-sectional rather than longitudinal, it might be possible to treat the two 50s 
age-cohort groups as being the same two 40s age-cohort groups ten years on, 
although they have grown marginally less interested in ethical investing as they have 
aged. We can investigate this by combining the 40s and 50s age cohorts. Table 6 
confirms that there are still two clusters in the combined age cohorts, while Table 7 
confirms that the two clustering methods produce identical clusters. 
Table 8 reports the distribution of the demographic and personal characteristics of 
individuals in their 40s and 50s allocated to each of the two clusters. We observe the 
same large differences between the two clusters previously observed in Table 5. But 
the important point is that the two clusters for the combined age cohorts are identical 
to the two clusters found when the two age cohorts were analysed separately, with the 
second of the two clusters, Cluster 2, displaying higher pay, longer tenure, higher 
additional contributions, less interest in ethical investing, lower risk capacity, a higher 
percentage of males, and a higher percentage of academics than the members of the 
first cluster, Cluster 1. A multivariate analysis-of-variance test indicates that the two 
clusters are statistically significantly different. As before, there are only small 
differences between the two clusters in terms of the degree of risk aversion and the 
propensity to match employer contributions.  But the most important point to emerge 
from combining the two age cohorts and comparing the results with the two age 
cohorts separately is that again all the members of one cluster (Cluster 2) have 
previously made additional contributions with USS, whereas none of the members of 
the other cluster Cluster 1) has previously made additional contributions. 
[Tables 8 & 9 around here] 
Table 9 presents estimates of a probit model of the characteristics for the combined 
40s and 50s age cohort clusters. A higher or more positive value of an estimated 
coefficient indicates a higher probability of the member being in Cluster 2, while a 
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lower or more negative value indicates a higher probability of the member being in 
Cluster 1. So, for example, higher pay increases the probability of the member being 
in Cluster 2, while a higher expected retirement age increases the probability of the 
member being in Cluster 1. 
In Tables 7 and 10, the fact that the additional contributions variable is such a striking 
indicator of which cluster a member belongs raises the possibility that these results 
are driven solely by this particular characteristic. To investigate this, we dropped the 
Additional_contributions variable and performed the cluster analysis using only the 
other four investment characteristics plus the personal characteristics. For the 40s 
cohort, the two alternative cluster methods (partition vs hierarchical) indicate two 
clusters as before, but each method produces a cluster that is both different from each 
other and different from the previous clusters. For the 50s cohort, the partition method 
produces two clusters, while the hierarchical method produces three clusters. So while 
it is impossible to say that that two clusters in Tables 7 and 10 depend only on the 
additional contributions variable, it would appear that the additional contributions 
variable has a sufficiently powerful impact that the clusters are nowhere near as 
strongly defined when this variable is dropped. 
Finally, we conducted a cluster analysis of the average risk aversion question scores 
(av_ATRQ) alone, using both clustering methods. Figure 5 presents a histogram of 
the distribution of the average scores across the 9,755 individuals in the sample. 
Recall that each individual has av_ATRQ based on their responses to the 12 ATRQs. 
Each question is based on a Likert score between 1-5, and so the average Likert score 
for each individual also has this same range. Higher values indicate greater risk 
aversion, and the histogram clearly shows a bunching or clustering of scores. The 
dendrogram for the single-linkage agglomerative hierarchical clustering method 
suggested 18 clusters in total (with 17 in one hierarchy). The partition method also 
identifies 18 clusters, although the number of members in each cluster differed from 
the hierarchical clustering method.  To assess whether these differences in cluster 
membership were significant, we report in Figure 6 the relationship between ATRQ 
scores and the intention to match across 18 clusters for both the hierarchical method 
(panel A) and the partition method (panel B).  Both panels show very similar patterns 
of responses, namely the lower the risk aversion, the higher the intention of the 
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member to match the additional employer contribution. We conclude from this that the 
two clustering methods produce sufficiently close clusters.  
[Figure 5 around here] 
Given this, we estimated a regression model of the attitude to risk scores for each of 
the two clustering methods with the following potential explanatory variables: age, pay, 
expected retirement age, tenure, pension wealth, %female, %couple, plus the match 
and additional contributions factors. Table 10 shows that only %female and %couple 
are statistically significant for both clustering methods.  For both methods, a 1% 
increase in females in a cluster increases av_ATRQ by 0.05, while a 1% increase in 
couples in a cluster reduces the av_ATRQ by a little over 0.02. The first result 
reconfirms one of the key findings of the study, while the second supports the idea 
that couples have lower risk aversion than singles because of risk sharing within the 
household. An examination of Table 8 shows how these findings influence the two 
clusters for the combined 40s and 50s age cohorts. The two clusters have av_ATRQs 
of 3.41 and 3.30, respectively. This difference is explained almost entirely by the 
higher percentage of females in the first cluster (46.4%) compared with the second 
(39.1%), since the percentage of couples in the two clusters is broadly similar at 73%. 
Other variables, such as pay, do not have a statistically significant impact on the 
av_ATRQ. Even the match is not statistically significant, despite Figure 6. 
[Figure 6 and Table 10 here] 
6. Conclusions 
Our aim in this study was to determine the number of default funds appropriate for a 
large occupational pension scheme with a defined contribution segment where the 
investment risk – and hence the uncertainty concerning the pension outcome – is 
borne by the scheme members. We examined a survey of member characteristics and 
risk attitudes applying cluster analysis (both hierarchical and partitioning) to segment 
the members into a small number of distinct groups or clusters. We tested whether 
these clusters are sufficiently distinctive to justify more than one default investment 
fund. 
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For USS pension scheme members, we were able to identify two distinct clusters in 
the 40s and 50s age cohorts – the most important age cohorts in terms of the timing, 
size and compounding of returns on pension contributions:26 The first identified cohort 
included members with lower average pay, shorter average tenure, more interest in 
ethical investing, higher risk capacity, a higher percentage of females, and a higher 
percentage of professional services staff. This cluster had not previously made 
additional contributions with USS (in terms of previous AVCs or added years 
contributions). A second identifiable cohort contained members with higher average 
pay, longer average tenure, less interest in ethical investing, lower risk capacity, a 
higher percentage of males, and a higher percentage of academics. This cluster had 
previously made additional contributions with USS (in terms of previous AVC or added 
years contributions). 
 
There were only small (and statistically insignificant) differences between the two 
clusters in terms of the average degree of risk aversion and the propensity to match 
employer contributions: the first cluster was marginally more risk averse and less likely 
to match than the second cluster. Conditioning only on the attitude to risk responses, 
we identified 18 clusters, with similar but not identical membership, depending on 
which clustering method is used. The differences in risk aversion across the 18 
clusters could be explained largely by differences in the percentage of females and 
the percentage of couples. Risk aversion increases as the percentage of females in 
the cluster increases because they typically are more risk averse than males, while it 
reduces as the percentage of couples increases because of greater risk sharing within 
the household. 
 
The survey also showed that, despite being on average more highly educated than 
the general population, USS members as a whole are marginally more risk averse 
than the general population, controlling for salary, although the difference is not 
significant. 
 
                                                 
26 Most members of the 20s and 30s age cohorts have salaries below the £55,000 threshold for 
participation in the DC segment of USS, while for members of USS above age 60, although they will 
be amongst the highest salary earners in USS and therefore paying the highest level of contributions, 
their shorter remaining time as active members reduces any compounded benefits from asset returns.  
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The DB underpin in USS gives members a much stronger capacity for taking greater 
risk with their DC savings than might otherwise be the case. Further, the similarity in 
risk aversion scores across both clusters in their 40s and 50s suggests that a single 
default fund might be suitable, so long as it reflects the genuine risk tolerance – which 
takes account of both the risk attitude and risk capacity – of the USS membership.  
USS members can be characterised as having an overall risk tolerance which is 
broadly similar to that of the national population with salaries above £30,000, since 
their slightly greater risk aversion is offset by greater risk-bearing capacity due to the 
DB underpin.  
 
On the other hand, the survey responses indicated that in some other dimensions 
apart from risk attitude, the scheme members segmented into mutually exclusive 
groups. Two prominent examples are whether members were (1) interested in ethical 
investing or not, or (2) required a Shariah-compliant fund or not.  
 
In short, there is no evidence of a requirement for multiple defaults within the current 
scheme structure, which simplifies matters considerably. USS decided on the basis of 
this research to introduce a single default lifestyle fund which would de-risk gradually 
in the 10 years prior to retirement.27  It also introduced an ethical default lifestyle fund, 
although a member making no choice would be allocated to the standard lifestyle fund.  
USS also offered 10 other (non-lifestyle) funds for self-selectors, including a Shariah-
compliant fund.28  
 
However, the low level of heterogeneity in risk tolerance across the membership 
suggests that it might be acceptable to offer just three funds in addition to the two 
default funds (rather than the current 10) to satisfy the diversity of risk attitudes: (1) a 
well-diversified fund with a higher level of risk than the default fund, (2) a well-
diversified fund with a lower level of risk than the default fund, and (3) a Shariah-
compliant fund. However, we acknowledge that self-select funds may be in place to 
                                                 
27 This therefore has similarities with Australia’s QSuper approach in having a lifestyle fund that de-
risks over 10 years.  However, USS decided not to have multiple age-related default funds, unlike 
QSuper. 
28 The full list of funds is available at  
https://www.uss.co.uk/how-uss-invests/the-fund/investments/uss-equity-holdings 
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meet the particular requirements of a small minority of members who would like more 
control over investment regardless of their risk preferences. 
 
The appropriate communication and engagement strategy follows on naturally from 
our empirical findings. This involves informing all members at joining about the default 
lifestyle fund in place for those who are not interested in engaging with their scheme 
‒ as well as the lifestyle ethical fund. Self-selectors, by contrast, need to be warned 
about both reckless conservatism and reckless adventurism and subsequently need 
to be guided or nudged at key ages (e.g., 30, 40, 50 and 60) into adjusting the risk 
exposure of their pension fund in order to maximise their lifetime welfare.  
 
Particular effort should therefore go into designing a suitable engagement programme 
for those members who have not previously made additional contributions with USS 
either voluntarily or as part of the match.29 USS should be particularly concerned about 
self-selectors who had never engaged with the scheme as younger members. When 
it comes to the appropriate time to begin de-risking, they are unlikely to be motivated 
to do so without suitable USS information and guidance. 
 
Finally, it is important to recognise that our findings might not generalise to other DC 
pension schemes for at least two reasons. First, most DC pension schemes do not 
have a DB underpin which allows certain groups of scheme members to take more 
investment risk than would otherwise be advisable. Second, USS members are more 
highly educated than most pension scheme members and this may have an influence, 
although we suspect, on the basis of the survey responses, that the influence might 
be negligible. 
  
                                                 
29 In the case of USS, the sponsors ended matching in April 2019. A new replacement question in any 
future survey would therefore be needed. 
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Figure 1: Potential welfare losses from a single default fund with 
heterogeneous scheme member preferences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Distribution of average risk aversion questions scores by age 
  
Note: The figure shows the distribution of the attitude to risk questions score for selected ages, both in 
the form of a histogram and a kernel density 
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Figure 3 – The average risk aversion questions score by age 
 
 
Figure 4 – Dendrogram from Ward’s hierarchical clustering method for the 50s 
age cohort 
 
Note: The dendrogram only reports groups with cut-off value of the L2squared dissimilarity measure  > 
500. There are 11 groups with cut-off > 500, and the numbers in each group are show below each 
group (e.g., 271 members in G1). There are many more groupings with cut-off < 500, until on the bottom 
row (not shown), there will be 3,135 groups with each member being in their own group, and therefore 
a dissimilarity measure of zero. 
 
  
3.2
3.25
3.3
3.35
3.4
3.45
3.5
3.55
3.6
27 32 37 42 47 52 57 62
Av
er
ga
e 
 ri
sk
 a
ve
rs
io
n 
sc
or
e
Age
36 
 
Figure 5 – Distribution of the average risk aversion scores across 9,755 survey 
respondents 
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Figure 6 – Relationship between average risk aversion scores and the intention 
to match across 18 clusters 
Panel A - Ward’s hierarchical method 
 
 
Panel B - k-means partition method 
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Table 1 – Summary demographics and personal characteristics of the 
respondents to the USS questionnaire 
Panel A (Values) 
       
 
Mean Std. dev. 10% 25% Median 75% 90% 
Age (years) 46 0.87 32 37 47 52 57 
Annual salary (£, based on 
bands) 
£50,010 £22,830 £30,000 £40,000 £50,000 £60,000 £80,000 
Expected retirement age 
(years) 
65.01 3.39 58 65 65 67 69 
USS tenure (years) 11.92 9.14 2 4 7 17 30 
 
Panel B (Categories) 
   
Gender Male Female 
 
 
5,377 (55%) 4,378 (45%) 
 
Marital status Married  
(incl. civil part.) 
Single  
(incl. sep., div., wid.) 
 
 6,360 (68%) 2,941 (32%)  
Job-type Academic Prof. services/Other 
 5,768 (59%) 3,987 (41%) 
 
 
Agree Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree 
Expect long, healthy retirment 7,177 (74%) 2,071 (21%) 507 (5%) 
USS pension will be main 
income 
6,745 (69%) 1,682 (17%) 1,328 (14%) 
Additional contributions to USS 
(with AVCs/added years) 
No Yes 
 
 
7,395 (76%) 2,360 (24%) 
 
Panel C (Age distribution)   
Age range Number of 
members 
Percent 
<25 32 0.33 
25 - 29 394 4.04 
30 - 34 1,038 10.64 
35 - 39 1,374 14.09 
40 - 44 1,411 14.46 
45 - 49 1,630 16.71 
50 - 54 1,667 17.09 
55 - 59 1,468 15.05 
60 - 64 616 6.31 
65 - 69 108 1.11 
>70 17 0.17 
Total 9,755 100 
Note: The table presents summary information on the demographic and personal characteristics of the 
9,755 members of USS who responded to the questionnaire. Numbers may not sum to 9,755 because 
of no-responses to some questions. In Panel A, salary information is based on mid-points of £10,000 
bands. Similarly Panel C reports ages in bands, and subsequent analysis of the age variable uses mid-
points of these age bands.
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Table 2 – Factor analysis of responses to 2 questions on ethical investment 
beliefs and risk capacity  
Eigenvalues Factor1 loading  
Factor1 Factor2  
Ethics 1.52 -0.141 0.476 
Risk capacity 0.643 -0.247 0.567 
 
Table 3 – Identifying the number of clusters for the 30s, 40s and 50s age 
cohorts 
Number 
of 
clusters     
Ward's hierarchical method k-means partition 
 
      30s 40s 50s 30s 40s 50s 
2 410.37 801.59 1,025.24 574.45 801.59 1,031.03 
3 351.78 688.71 703.21 549.02 787.34 854.71 
4 354.59 590.33 608.08 532.31 720.20 735.83 
5 365.11 554.00 568.01 512.05 685.69 691.73 
6 378.65 513.40 535.47 501.94 625.60 627.11 
7 364.86 490.02 505.32 480.91 629.91 609.11 
8 358.72 469.99 484.40 450.45 596.06 605.97 
9 348.05 456.19 465.51 440.56 560.92 579.33 
10 340.49 450.03 448.31 427.85 538.42 541.56 
Note: Numbers in the table are values of the Calinski-Harabasz pseudo-F statistic for each potential 
cluster 
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Table 4 – Cross-tabulation of clusters from the k-means partition and Ward’s 
hierarchical methods for the 30s, 40s and 50s age cohorts 
 
Panel A: 30s  
Clusters (k-means) 
Group 
(Ward) 
1 2 Total 
1 833 243 1,076 
2 589 747 1,336 
Total 1,422 990 2,412 
 
Panel B: 40s  
Cluster (k-means) 
Group 
(Ward) 
1 2 Total 
1 2,346 0 2,346 
2 0 695 695 
Total 2,346 695 3,041 
 
Panel C: 50s  
Clusters (k-means) 
Group 
(Ward) 
1 2 Total 
1 5 1,993 1,998 
2 1,137 0 1,137 
Total 1,142 1,993 3,135 
Note: Each panel shows the cross-tabulations of the number of observations by age-cohort of the two 
clusters formed by Ward’s hierarchical method (Group) and k-means partition (Clusters). 
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Table 5 – Characteristics by clusters for the 40s and 50s age cohorts (k-means partition method)  
40s 
   
50s 
   
 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. 
Av_ATRQ 3.39 0.68 3.26 0.70 3.43 0.66 3.33 0.70 
Match 3.53 0.94 4.04 0.92 3.48 0.99 3.91 0.98 
Additional_contributions 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Ethics_fact1 0.005 0.905 -0.058 0.950 -0.052 0.917 -0.053 0.929 
Risk_capacity_fact1 -0.003 0.647 0.165 0.638 -0.062 0.698 0.173 0.635 
Age 44.5 2.5 45.2 2.4 54.2 2.5 54.7 2.5 
Pay £49,856 £20,951 £55,198 £20,792 £54,041 £26,575 £61,821 £25,196 
Exp_retire 65.1 3.3 64.6 3.5 64.3 3.4 63.6 3.4 
Tenure 10.7 6.9 14.0 6.4 14.9 10.1 20.0 8.9 
Pens_wealth £285,334 £241,162 £399,574 £247,750 £351,053 £338,147 £504,929 £335,506 
F(5,3013) 33.24**        
F(5,3103)     51.25**    
Obs 2,346   695   1,993 
 
1,142 
 
%female 46.7% 
 
38.8% 
 
46.12% 
 
39.25% 
 
%couple 72.0% 
 
73.0% 
 
73.03% 
 
73.50% 
 
%academic 55.8% 
 
67.8% 
 
59.51% 
 
68.99% 
 
F(3,2887) 13.16**        
F(3,3000)     10.94**    
Note: The table shows the average characteristics for the two clusters formed for the 40s and 50s age-cohorts.   The F-statistic for a multivariate analysis-of-variance is reported to test for the joint 
significant differences between clusters for the five common characteristics (Age, Pay, Exp_retire, Tenure, Pens_wealth) and for the three personal characteristics (%female, %couple, %academic); 
** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.  Av_ATRQ is the member’s average ATRQ score. Match indicates likelihood of the member matching the available 1% employer contribution. 
Additional_contributions is a 0-1 dummy indicating if the member has previously made additional contributions with the scheme by making AVCs or buying added years. Ethics_fact1 is the single 
factor indicating the degree of member interest in making ethical investments. Risk-capacity_fact1 is the single factor indicating  the member’s risk capacity. Age is the member’s age. Pay is the 
member’s salary. Exp_retire is the member’s expected retirement age. Tenure measures the number of years the member has been an active member of USS. Pens_wealth is the member’s 
pension wealth. We measured this as (1/80) x Tenure x Pay x (1.051/1.022)^(65-Age); this incorporates the following assumptions about USS: a capitalisation factor for the pension at retirement of 
20, a lump sum of 3 x the pension at retirement, pay growth of CPI + 2%, a discount rate of gilts + 0.75% (from the USS 2017 Actuarial Valuation), with Consumer Prices Index (CPI) = 3.1% in 
November 2017 and the 15-year gilt yield = 1.45% on 15 December 2017. Note that this measure of pension wealth was valid at the time of the survey and does not take into account subsequent 
scheme rule changes from 1 April 2016.  %female measures the percentage of the cluster that is female. %couple measures the percentage of the cluster that is married or in civil partnership. 
%academic measures the percentage of the cluster that is academic rather than professional services. 
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Table 6 – Identifying the number of clusters for the combined 40s and 50s age 
cohorts 
 
Number 
of 
clusters     
Ward's hierarchical method k-means partition method  
2 1868.59 1868.59 
3 1443.14 1646.05 
4 1210.05 1448.40 
5 1074.53 1361.13 
6 1008.64 1320.07 
7 971.91 1258.43 
8 940.97 1190.57 
9 912.89 1117.80 
10 876.70 1066.76 
Note: Numbers in the table are values of the Calinski-Harabasz pseudo-F statistic for each potential 
cluster. 
 
Table 7 – Cross-tabulation of the clusters from Ward’s hierarchical and the k-
means partition methods for the combined 40s and 50s age cohorts 
 
 
Clusters (k-means) 
Group 
(Ward) 
1 2 Total 
1 4,339 0 4,339 
2 0 1,837 1,837 
Total 4,339 1,837 6,176 
Note: The table shows the cross-tabulations of the number of observations by age-cohort of the two 
clusters formed by Ward’s hierarchical method (Group) and the k-means partition method (Clusters). 
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Table 8 – Characteristics by clusters for the combined 40s and 50s age cohorts (k-means partition method) 
 
     
 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. 
Av_ATRQ 3.41 0.67 3.30 0.70 
Match 3.51 0.96 3.96 0.96 
Additional_contributions 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Ethics_fact1 -0.021 0.911 -0.055 0.937 
Risk_capacity_fact1 -0.030 0.672 0.170 0.636 
Age 48.9 5.4 51.1 5.2 
Pay £51,780 £23,791 £59,304 £23,831 
Exp_retire 64.8 3.4 64.0 3.5 
Tenure 12.6 8.7 17.7 8.6 
Pens_wealth £315,546 £291,617 £464,893 £309,331 
F(5,6122) 113.21**    
Obs 4,339   1,837   
%female 46.4% 
 
39.1% 
 
%couple 72.5% 
 
73.3% 
 
%academic 57.5% 
 
68.5% 
 
F(3,5891) 26.69**    
Note: The table shows the average characteristics for the two clusters formed for the combined 40s and 50s age-cohorts.  Both clustering methods produce 
the same results. The F-statistic for a multivariate analysis-of-variance is reported to test for the joint significant differences between clusters for the five 
common characteristics (Age, Pay, Exp_retire, Tenure, Pens_wealth) and for the three personal characteristics (%female, %couple, %academic); ** indicates 
statistical significance at the 1% level.  For the definition of the variables, see Table 5.
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Table 9 – Probit model of the two combined 40s and 50s age cohort clusters in 
terms of characteristics (k-means partition method) 
 
Characteristic  Coef.    z-stat 
Age 0.0216 5.80    
Pay  5.21e-06    3.63    
Exp_retire -0.0244    -4.79    
Tenure 0.0378    7.80   
Pens_wealth -3.08e-07    -1.67  
Constant -0.7709 -2.00    
Note: The table shows, for the 2 clusters formed by combining the 40s and 50s age cohorts, the results 
of a probit model of the five common characteristics (Age, Pay, Exp_retire, Tenure, Pens_wealth).  For 
the definition of the variables, see Table 5. Number of obs. = 6,128, LR χ2(5) = 525.74, Prob > χ2 = 
0.0000, R2 =  0.075 
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Table 10 – Regression model of the attitude to risk scores on the characteristics for Ward’s hierarchical and k-means 
partition methods 
 
 
Ward's hierarchical method 
 
k-means partition method 
 
Variable Coef.   t-stat.   Coef.   t-stat.  
%female 0.0474 8.21   0.0472 13.03  
%couple -0.0201 -2.06   -0.0247 -2.36  
Cons. 7.4373 19.91   7.5609 14.95  
Adj. R2 0.968    0.976    
Std. err. 0.203    0.114    
No. obs. 18    18    
         
Note: The table shows, for the 18 clusters formed by each of the Ward’s hierarchical method and the k-means partition method, the results of a regression of 
the average risk attitude question score (av_ATRQ) in each cluster on, respectively, the percentage of females (%females) and the percentage that is married 
or in civil partnership (%couples) in the same cluster.  For the definition of the variables, see Table 5. 
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